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n May 2019, O Globo Journal, after surveying the open 
database of the Brazilian Institute of Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources – IBAMA, analyzed the rate of 
payment of environmental fines, highlighting the existence of a 
predominant feature among Environmental offenders: the more 
serious the violation and the higher the fine amount, the lower 
the payment rate1. This analysis took into consideration all fines 
processed and judged in the last ten years, concluding that among 
the fines applied within the range of R$ 50,000 to R$ 100,000, 
only 4.48% were paid.  In relation to fines between R$ 100 
thousand and R$ 1 million, only 0.66% were paid. In turn, fines 
over R$ 1 million had only 0.54% compliance rate. Also, fines in 
the range between R$ 1 million and R$ 5 million, only 0.33% 
were met. Finally, fines above R $ 5 million have an effective 
payment of only 0.65%. 
Considering the data presented, it is necessary, first, to assess 
their reliability, and once the statistics are confirmed, it is 
necessary studying why fines are not met, taking consensualism as 
a possible solution to safeguard the public interest of the State, 
which is environment preservation. 
Therefore, this study aims to analyze the latest IBAMA’s 
Management Report2 in order to verify the statistics presented by 
the O Globo Journal, and, afterwards, whether the State’s 
imposing, imperative and unilateral form of action is in 
accordance with the dynamics of today’s society, proposing the 
use of consensus techniques to increase compliance rates for 
administrative fines and reduce the rates of environmental 
violation by consensus culture. 
In order to achieve this aim, from the hypothetical-deductive 
method, it was first sought to conceptualize legal sanction 
systems, in order to understand why negative sanctions are not 
 
1 V. SASSINE, « Maiores infratores ambientais são os que menos pagam ao IBAMA », O 
Globo, 2019, [https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/maiores-infratores-ambientais-sao-os-
que-menos-pagam-ao-ibama-23680665] 
2 Brasil, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DO MEIO AMBIENTE E DOS RECURSOS NATURAIS 
RENOVÁVEIS – IBAMA, Relatório de Gestão, December 2017:  
[https://www.ibama.gov.br/auditorias/relatorios] 
I 
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met or there is a low compliance rate. Then, the analyses turn to 
the dogmatic contours of the paradigm breaking of a Sanctioning 
Public Administration, demonstrating the possibility and the 
constitutionality of this new way of acting that is called 
consensualism. Afterwards, were presented the consensus 
techniques applicable to cases of administrative environmental 
violations, concluding that these can potentially help the public 
interest, which is protection of environment, as well as increase 
the discharge rate of environmental fines. 
§1 – IBAMA’S MANAGEMENT REPORT OF 2017 
IBAMA annually publishes its Management Report; a document 
that presents, among several premises, the results of the 
objectives and strategic projects and institutional indicators3. 
Although the commitment to publish is annual, the last 
Management Report published on the municipality’s website was 
in 2017, the one will be the object of this research.  
Considering the delimitation proposed in the introduction, the 
analysis of the Management Report will be limited to item 3.1. – 
which regulates IBAMA’s objective on the expansion and 
effectiveness of environmental control –, item 3.4 – which 
discusses IBAMA’s operational performance – and item 3.5 – 
which deals with the management of fines imposed as a result of 
the inspection activity.  
Analyzing the data presented, in fact, the percentages are 
discouraging, because, not only the fine discharge rate is very low, 
but also there is a high rate of possible procedural injunctions, as 
well as pending infringers’ registration in the Public Sector 
Unsecured Credit Register – CADIN. In the last three years there 
were more than twenty thousand registrations pending between 
individuals and companies4. Thus, considering item 3.5 of the 
Management Report, and considering the absolute number and 
percentage of fines that are at risk of prescription, IBAMA states 
that there are about 450 administrative proceedings to investigate 
environmental violations with risk of ending without resolution5. 
Regarding the percentage of fines payment, considering the 
amount of 15,694 notices of infraction drawn up, equivalent to a 
value of more than R$ 3 billion, only 1,786 (11.38%) were paid, 
which corresponds to only R$ 9.5 million (0.30%). It is evident, 
therefore, that the fines discharge rate is very low, and even more 
alarming is the amount that is actually paid, which is not even 1% 
of the amount due. 
Regarding the objective addressed in item 3.1 of the Management 
Report, IBAMA emphasizes that its foundation is “to break down 
environmental control and enforcement strategies that provide 
 
3 Ibidem, p. 8. 
4 Ibidem, pp. 78-79. 
5 Ibidem, p. 79. 
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for deterring illicit persons and effectively recovering 
environmental damage”6. At this Report point, it is noticed that 
there is a low recognition of compliance with environmental 
administrative sanctions, which led to the promotion of efforts 
for the adoption of the Fine Conversion Program in services of 
preservation, improvement and environmental recovery after 
Federal Decree No. 9.179, published in 2017, as will be explained 
in a specific topic of this study. 
Given this context, it is important to ascertain the reasons for the 
low rate of compliance with sanctioning administrative decisions 
to present alternatives to its increase and to reach the public 
interest: protection and preservation of the environment. 
Thus, first, it should be noticed that one of the indicators of the 
low rate of compliance with fines is IBAMA’s procedural 
inefficiency. This is because, as noticed in Management Report 
item 3.1.5, after analyzing the main indicators oriented to the 
institutional results, the “rate of administrative proceedings for 
the assessment of environmental infringement judged”7 was 
around 21% in 2017 and the “procedural efficiency ratio – IEP” 
was in the range of 2.4%8.  
Accordingly, as regards IBAMA’s operational performance, it is 
important to highlight that, as stated in item 3.4.2, the execution 
process performance of the infraction notices is too slow, 
requiring an average time of three and a half years to conclude the 
execution, whose calculation considers “the average time between 
the assessment and the judgment of the infraction notices, for 
those notices that were ultimately judged”9. 
What can be seen, therefore, is that the difficulties presented in 
relation to the low environmental fines payment rate are 
problems of IBAMA’s own procedural management, especially 
due to the delay in the finalization of the administrative 
proceedings and the lack of compliance with the consequences. 
In the event of non-payment fines, they do not propose to 
change the conduct of the sanctioned, which shows that the 
administrative fines are not fulfilling its true function as an 
instrument to achieve the public interest which is the preservation 
and repair of the environment.  
Beyond the management problem, there is also the recognized 
“crowding out effect”, named by Brian Sheppard and Fiery 
Cushman10, which occurs when there is a massive loss of 
adherence to the normative text. To illustrate this phenomenon, 
the example of the rule created by a daycare director who wanted 
 
6 Ibidem, p. 22. 
7 Ibidem, p. 27-28. 
8 Ibidem, p. 30. 
9 Ibidem, p. 77. 
10 B. SHEPPARD, F. CUSHMAN, « Evaluating norms: an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between norm-content, operator, and charitable behavior », Vanderbilt Law 
Review, Columbia, vol.63, No.1, pp.55-109, 2009, p. 63. 
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parents not to be late to pick up their children is brought up11. In 
order to reduce delays, a fine was imposed on those parents who 
violated the time to pick up their children. The director’s 
objective seemed clear enough: to increase adherence to the rule, 
creating a disincentive to noncompliance. Meanwhile, just the 
opposite was consumed: the fine became an incentive to break 
the rule. It was worth it the parents to leave their children longer 
in the nursery, and pay the fine. In conclusion, the creation of the 
rule encouraged its own breach. With the environmental fines the 
same happened. Part of the amount there is paid, is not paid 
because the lawbreakers understood their misconduct, but 
because is worth it to pay and continue damaging the 
environment.    
Given the problems presented, it is necessary to analyze the legal 
sanctioning system, in order to effectively understand why 
negative sanctions have not been as effective as their claim. 
§2 – LEGAL SANCTION SYSTEM 
The legal sanction has several aspects and is not an absolute 
gender; it encompasses distinct areas of applicability and coexists 
with other types of sanction, such as moral sanction, social 
sanction and religious sanction. According to Daniel Ferreira, this 
coexistence stems precisely from the fact that the legal order is 
only a facet of the normative order, which adds the moral order, 
the social order and the religious order12. The analysis of these 
various genres of sanction, however, would be excessively dense, 
and would lead to a true monographic study of the subject, so 
that the present analysis will be devoted solely to the legal 
sanctioning system.  
The legal sanction is predominantly recognized as the 
consequence of the practice of an illicit act, and, therefore, as a 
negative measure attributed by the order in the face of the non-
observance of a behavior prescribed by a primary legal norm13. 
Thus, the legal sanction is recognized as a presumed consequence  
– because it will not necessarily be applied –  determined by the 
legal system to a behavior incompatible with the violated rules14.  
From the above conceptions, it can be said that, commonly, the 
sanction is considered in its negative bias, presenting itself as an 
instrument of defense of the homeland legal system. However, 
 
11 N. STRUCHINER, P. H. CHRISMANN, “Aspectos filosóficos e psicológicos das 
punições: reunindo algumas peças do quebra-cabeça”, Caderno CRH,  Salvador,  vol. 
25, n. 2,  pp. 133-150, 2012. p. 133, 
 [http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0103-
49792012000500010&lang=pt]. 
12 D. FERREIRA, Teoria geral da infração administrativa a partir da constituição Federal de 1988, 
Belo Horizonte, Fórum, 2009, p. 80. 
13 R. M. MELLO, “Regime Jurídico das Sanções Administrativas”, Revista Eletrônica de 
Estudos Jurídicos da OAB-PR, Curitiba, No. 4, 2009, p. 37, 
[http://admin.oabpr.org.br/revistaeletronica/?secao=revista04].  
14 D. FERREIRA, Sanções Administrativas, São Paulo, Malheiros, 2001, p. 14.  
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other aspects of the legal sanction are recognized; Some authors 
even criticize purely punitive sanctions, such as Burrhus Frederic 
Skinner, who points out that severe punishment has an immediate 
effect on reducing the tendency to act in a certain way, but in the 
long run this behavior is not eliminated, so temporary effects are 
obtained with the cost of reducing efficiency15. Thus, when it 
comes to sanctions arising from the law, Skinner points out that 
the norm basically has two functions: the first would be to 
determine a behavior and the second to specify a certain 
consequence, which is usually a punishment16. However, the 
political scientist highlights the existence of alternative techniques 
to the negative-punitive sanction17, opening the way to positive 
sanction by prizes and incentives controls, which would be more 
effective than negative sanction.  
Regarding the positive sanction itself, Norberto Bobbio points 
out that it is related to a good to whom practices a certain 
conduct, being the opposite of the meaning of a negative 
sanction. In his words: « while punishment is a reaction to a bad 
deed, reward is a reaction to a good deed »18. According to 
Bobbio, what distinguish positive from negative sanctions is the 
fact that in the former there is an encouragement of conduct and 
in the latter a discouragement19.  
Although the existence of positive and negative sanctions is 
recognized, the truth is that the control of the behavior of 
Brazilian society occurs mainly through negative sanctions20. In 
this case, it is necessary to emphasize that the sanction, as an 
institute of behavior control, does not correspond to an end in 
itself; it is an instrument whose purpose consists in the 
maintenance or restitution of the legal order in a Democratic 
State of Law21.  
The reality of noncompliance with punitive sanctions, however, 
indicates that this exclusively negative character of legal sanctions 
and their existence as the sole means of controlling behavior must 
be rethought. This is because the increasingly complex and 
dynamic evolution of Brazilian society, especially in the search for 
greater participation, and the gradual opening to a consensus 
State, require some rethinking of State action. Thus, the 
encouragement of conducts (positive sanctions) or consensual 
solutions to covenants is increasingly reiterated, in order to 
 
15 B. F. SKINNER, Ciência e comportamento humano, São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 2003, 
p. 208.   
16 Ibidem, p. 369-370. 
17 Ibidem, p. 376. 
18 N. BOBBIO, “As sanções positivas”, in: Da estrutura à função: novos estudos da teoria do 
direito, Trad. Daniela B. Versiani, Barueri, Manole, 2007, p. 24. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 M J. F. TELLA, F. F. TELLA, “Fundamento e finalidade da sanção: existe um direito 
de castigar?”, Trad. Cláudia de Miranda Avena, São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 
2008, p. 45. 
21 J. B. PALMA, Sanção e Acordo na Administração Pública, São Paulo, Malheiros, 2015, 
p. 87. 
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mitigate the image of an imperative, repressive and protective 
State, highlighting its promotional function22. It is in this field that 
the Consensual Public Administration study is highlighted. 
§3 – CONSENSUAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Unsurprisingly, the establishment of a Democratic Rule of Law 
based on rights and guarantees requires some rethinking of some 
forms of State action, recognizing as an integral part of the legal 
system not only formal law but all explicit and implicit 
constitutional principles23. This is because society grows in a 
complex way, having greater needs, including greater democratic 
participation. It is in this scenario, therefore, that the 
transmutation of the bipolar paradigm citizen-State to the 
multipolar paradigm occurs24. In plural societies, it is no longer 
possible to speak of a single public interest to be achieved 
exclusively by imposing sanctions. The public interest is plural, 
fluid, fragmentary, partial and determined according to each 
specific situation, and it is very common that in the same 
situation there are several public interests to be achieved. It 
changes –  but does not give up –  the paradigm of public interest 
supremacy, as it is sometimes commonly acknowledged, 
considering that “private interests coinciding with community 
public interests are in conflict with other public interests that 
have national nature. There is no public-private distinction or 
opposition, just as there is no superiority of public over private 
moment”25. Thus, the citizen-administration partnership must be 
rethought, aiming equality in the construction of the procedure, 
so that the public interest, previously confused with the 
subjectivity of the State and conceived in a unitary way, pluralizes 
itself in the Democratic State, allowing the recognition of various 
public interests, which require the “substitution of unilateral 
activity by consensus and equality, in a context of citizen 
participation”26. Thus, in times of dogma revision, the 
 
22 G. T. DANTAS, “Função promocional do direito e sanção premial na perspectiva 
metodológica de Durkheim”, Revista Direito UNIFACS – Debate Virtual, No. 149, 
november 2012, pp. 12-13, 
 [https://revistas.unifacs.br/index.php/redu/article/view/2374/1743]. 
23 D. W. HACHEM, « A noção constitucional de desenvolvimento para além do viés 
econômico: reflexos sobre algumas tendências do Direito Público brasileiro », A&C – 
Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, year 13, n. 53, pp. 133-
168, july/september, 2013, p. 140. 
24 V. L. L. VALLE, Autoridade e consenso nos contratos administrativos: um 
reposicionamento do regime jurídico contratual brasileiro à luz da doutrina europeia dos 
contratos administrativos, in: D. W. HACHEM, E. GABARDO, E. D. SALGADO, (Coord.), 
Direito administrativo e suas transformaço ̃es atuais – Homenagem ao professor Romeu Felipe 
Bacellar Filho, Anais do Seminário da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal do 
Paraná, Curitiba, Íthala, 2016, p. 451.  
25 S. CASSESSE, Sabino, La arena pública: nuevos paradigmas para el Estado, in: S. 
CASSESSE, La crisis Del Estado. Buenos Aires, Abeledo Perrot, 2003, p. 159. 
26 L. C. PENA, O papel do controle consensual diante da crise de legitimidade do estado, Dissertação 
(mestrado) – Fundação Mineira de Educação e Cultura - FUMEC, Programa de Pós-
Graduação em Direito, Belo Horizonte, 2012, p. 38. 
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phenomenon of consensus State has occupied a significant place 
on the agenda of doctrinal discussions; phenomenon resulting 
from the understanding of traditional administrative activity as an 
activity incompatible with the current scenario experienced in the 
country, as it is founded on the necessary existence of an 
imperative power, identified in the obligation of unilateral 
administrative act, and that rarely makes room for consensus 
formation. In the words of Luciana Calado Pena, the current 
scenario takes care of the « overcoming the activity of control-
sanction, rooted in the positivism proposed by Kelsen », in which 
« the State would be as efficient as to strictly comply with all 
procedures outlined ». Thus, according to the jurist, the 
overcoming of this control model and the extension of the 
administrative process to the protagonism, allow the consensual 
instruments of control to benefit from this change, « being 
feasible nowadays to replace the sanction-control by the 
consensus-control.; repression-control, by impulse-control »27. 
The existence of this new model of State control based on 
dialogicity is found in several norms of the Brazilian law order, 
such as the Law of Rules Introduction of Brazilian Law  
–  LINDB, which in its article 26 – regulated by Federal Decree 
No. 9.830/19, articles 10 emphasizes that in order to eliminate a 
contentious situation in the application of public law, the 
administrative authority may, for reasons of relevant general 
interest, enter into a commitment with the interested parties. The 
existence of this State control based on dialogue derives not only 
from legislation, but also from the participatory characteristic 
assumed by contemporary society itself, which leaves its status as 
a mere electoral class to demand effective participation in State 
decisions, valuing dialogue for the realization of their rights. The 
valorization of the dialogue, thus, impelled the process of gradual 
loss of the exclusively unilateral, imperative and imposing 
character of the State, opening itself wing for a more negotiating 
action28. 
Given this new act, it is necessary to highlight the quality of the 
administrative sanction as a prerogative29 available to the 
Administration, starting from the understanding that all 
administrative activity is instrumental in character, so that « the 
public administrator never acts for free, but always in function of 
an objective, qualified by law as a public interest, which must be 
attained. The end, not the will, drives public administrative 
 
27 Ibidem, p. 37. 
28 F. A. MARQUES NETO, T. M. CYMBALISTA, « Os acordos substitutivos no 
procedimento sancionatório e da sanção », Revista Eletrônica de Direito Administrativo 
Econômico (REDAE), Salvador, Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Pu ́blico, n. 27, 
august/september/october, 2011, [http://www.direitodoestado.com/revista/REDAE-
27-AGOSTO-2011-FLORIANO-AZEVEDO-TATIANAMATIELLO.pdf]. 
29 Sanctioning prerogative means the power of public administration to impose 
imperative and unilateral administrative sanctions. J. B. PALMA, Op. cit., p. 87. 
Consensualism and state: a solution to the low environmental fines payment rate?  
Mirela Miró Ziliotto   
 
 
– 210 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2020 – Vol 9] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
 
activity »30. In the present study, the public interest analyzed is the 
preservation and repair of the environment. In this sense, it is 
clear that if the end that is sought with the sanction can be 
achieved by other means, if these prove to be more efficient, they 
can be prioritized over that. Especially because the State should 
no longer act apart from society, but should act jointly society 
through consensual mechanisms31. 
Thus, the classic image of a Public Administration based solely on 
unilateral forms of conflict resolution needs to be overcome, 
especially because the pursuit of consensus by citizens must be 
the substantial criterion for justifying and guiding administrative 
decisions32. Thus, effective democracy, pluralist affirmation, 
heterogeneity of interests and greater proximity between the State 
and society are the relevant factors that demonstrate the need to 
adapt administrative law to its time33. Therefore, it is possible to 
understand that there is no more exclusive space to the State 
imperative face, and the degree of legitimacy of State action 
should also take into account the degree of interaction between 
the State and civil society34. 
 
A) Consensualism and Public Interest 
 
Considering this paradigm break, the guidelines for consensual 
administrative activity, with their new mechanisms and structures, 
should have their legal viability evaluated, especially from the 
perspective of legality versus consensus, especially considering its 
democratic face. In this sense, it is necessary to deepen the 
doctrinal discussions related to the applicability and effectiveness 
of the conclusion of agreements in the environmental sphere, 
considering the existence of express legal permissive to the 
formation of consensual acts35 replacing –  or jointly –  unilateral 
acts in environmental administrative proceedings, as foreseen in 
Federal Decree No. 6.514/2008. 
 
30 A. A. DALLARI, « Administração Pu ́blica no Estado de Direito », Revista Trimestral de 
Direito Público, São Paulo, No. 5, january/mars, 1994, p. 36.  
31 E. ANDRADE, O Mandado de Segurança: a busca da verdadeira especialidade, Rio de Janeiro, 
Lumen Juris, 2010, p. 43. 
32 A. S. ARAGÃO, « A consensualidade no Direito Administrativo », Revista de Informação 
Legislativa, Brasília, a. 42, No. 167. july/september, 2005, p. 294. 
33 O. MEDAUAR, Odete, “Direito administrativo em evolução”, 2nd ed, São Paulo, Revista 
dos Tribunais, 2003, p. 210. 
34 G. J. OLIVEIRA, “Governança Pu ́blica e Parcerias do Estado: a relevância dos acordos 
administrativos para a nova gestão pu ́blica”, Revista Eletrônica sobre a Reforma do Estado 
(RERE), Salvador, Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Pu ́blico, No. 23, 
september/october/november, 2010. p. 2, 
 [http://www.direitodoestado.Com/revista/RERE-23-SETEMBRO-2010-
GUSTAVO-JUSTINO-OLIVEIRA.pdf]. 
35 Consensual administrative acts are conceptualized by Juan Parejo ALFONSO as the 
agreement of wills between a Public Administration and one or several citizens, 
regulated by Administrative Law, concluded within an administrative process. L. P. 
ALFONSO, “Los actos administrativos consensuales en el derecho español”, A&C - 
Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, a. 1, n. 13, pp. 1-244, 
july/september, 2003, p. 17. 
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In this context, it is important to highlight that consensual acts, in 
general, can be mechanisms of State efficiency and economic-
social development, since “the decision being built in a 
participatory manner, with effective management and individual 
action, is unlikely to be challenged administratively or  
judicially”36, reducing costs (financial, personnel and time) and 
ensuring speedy compliance with the proposed measures. For the 
principle of participation, as it encourages citizens to intervene in 
administrative tasks, is the basis that legitimizes the consensual 
actions of the Government37. 
Consensualism, therefore, should not be evaluated as an 
instrument of public interest disposition, but as a mechanism to 
achieve it more efficiently. Thus, when the Public Administration 
opts for a dialogical solution, it is neither compromising the 
public interest nor having it, but rather it is choosing a competent 
means to defend its own public interest38. 
Not without reason, the low rates of discharge of environmental 
fines show that the imposition of the imperative and unilateral 
decision has not proved to be an adequate means to achieve the 
objectives of the law, since it’s imposing and extroversive 
character is not, to a large extent, accepted by the sanctioned39. 
Moreover, in plural societies, “the very concept of public interest 
opens itself to dialogue with the plurality of interests that law 
disciplines”40. 
 
B) Environmental Agreements 
 
Responsibility for environmental damage received great 
importance in the country following the 1988 Constitution, on its 
Article 225 disciplining that “everyone has the right to an 
ecologically balanced environment”41. Likewise, Article 225, §3 of 
the Brazilian Constitution, stipulates that “conduct and activities 
deemed harmful to the environment will subject violators, 
individuals or legal entities, to criminal and administrative 
sanctions, regardless of the obligation to repair the damage 
 
36 L. C. PENA, Op. cit., p. 40. 
37 O. A. BATISTA JÚNIOR, Transações Administrativas, São Paulo, QuartierLatin, 2007, 
p. 463. 
38 A. A. DALLARI, Op. cit., p. 16. 
39 F. A. MARQUES NETO points out that « traditional unilaterality and exorbitance public 
authority exercise (extroversial power) must give way to dialogue, mediation and the 
balancing of divergent interests, without obviously neglecting the protection of the 
community against abuses of economic agents ». F. A. MARQUES NETO, “Poder de 
Sanção – Órgão Regulador – ANEEL”, Revista de Direito Administrativo, Rio de Janeiro, 
vol. 221, 2000, p. 355, 
 [http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rda/article/view/47607/45131]. 
40 M. P. D. BUCCI, Políticas públicas: reflexões sobre o conceito jurídico, São Paulo, 
Saraiva, 2006, p. 45. 
41 A. WUNDERUCH, « A responsabilidade por danos ambientais: do cenário atual à 
avaliação crítica ao modelo de imputação de entes coletivos e individuais trazidos pela 
Lei 9.608/1995 no Brasil », Revista Brasileira de Ciências Criminais, vol. 114, a. 23, pp. 203-
221, São Paulo, Ed. RT, May/June, 2015, p. 204. 
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caused”. In addition, following the promulgation of 
Constitutional Amendment No. 42 of 2003, “the defense of the 
environment” became part of the principles to be followed by the 
economic order, according to article 170, item VI, of the 
Constitution. There is no doubt, therefore, that the protection of 
the environment is a fundamental principle of the Rule of Law 
and must be achieved through proper strategic environmental 
management, which can be done through public policies. 
Although there is no consensus on the concept of public policy, it 
can be said that it is a “field of knowledge that seeks at the same 
time to put government into action and/or to analyze this action 
(independent variable) and, when necessary, propose changes in 
the course of these actions (dependent variable)”42. Still, it can be 
said, according to Maria Paula Bucci, that thinking of public 
policy is to seek coordination, either between federated entities, 
between powers, between entities, or between the State and 
society, which is why the importance has grown consensual 
instruments43. 
Thus, in the environmental sphere, these public policies can, for 
example, be motivated to raise society’s awareness through 
positive sanctions, guaranteeing prizes to those who adopt 
conducts to preserve the environment, or to solve environmental 
conflicts through the institution of remediation programs, such as 
the conversion of administrative fines into environmental 
preservation, recovery and improvement services. In this sense, it 
can be emphasized that public policies have repercussions on the 
economy and society, so that any theory of public policy must 
also explain the relations between State, politics, economy and 
society44.  
As far as environmental conflicts are concerned, the applicable 
rule is Federal Decree No 6.514/2008, which deals precisely with 
environmental infractions and administrative sanctions and 
establishes the federal administrative process for the 
determination of these violations. Thus, its first chapter is 
intended to discipline environmental conduct and its respective 
administrative sanctions; Chapter II, in turn, regulates the 
administrative process to investigate environmental violations.  
This study will be limited to the analysis of Section VII of 
Chapter II, which deals with the “Simple Fine Conversion 
Procedure to Preservation, Improvement and Recovery of 
Environmental Quality Services”.45 It is understood that this 
procedure was a public policy introduced on October 23, 2017, 
through Federal Decree No. 9.179/2017, which amended the 
 
42 C. SOUZA, “Políticas públicas: uma revisão de literatura”, Revista Sociologia, Porto 
Alegre, a. 8, No. 16, July/December, p. 20-45, p. 26. 
43 M. P. D. BUCCI, Op. cit., p. 44. 
44 C. SOUZA, Op. cit., p. 25. 
45 IBAMA's Normative Instruction nº 6/2018. Brasil, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DO MEIO 
AMBIENTE E DOS RECURSOS NATURAIS RENOVÁVEIS – IBAMA, Normative instruction nº 6, 
february 2018, [https://www.ibama.gov.br/conversao-multas-ambientais#modalildades].  
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provisions of Federal Decree No. 6.514/08, precisely those from 
Article 139 thereof, considering the low fines payment rate, in 
order to ensure that the public interest is met. This justification is 
contained in several excerpts of the 2017 Management Report, so 
IBAMA points out that one of the factors that contributed to a 
low collection of environmental fines in 2015 was « the non-
improvement of the environmental sanctioning process due to 
the absence of the fines conversion instrument »46. Thus, the 
municipality expressed in its report that the program of 
conversion of fines into environmental services would be a true 
paradigm shift in the performance of IBAMA that could bring 
important benefits to the entity47.   
As far as the converting fine procedure is concerned, it should be 
noticed that its applicability applies only to simple fine cases, and 
in fact, there is no total conversion, but a discount to the 
consolidated value of the fine, behold, the one who chooses to 
promote services of preservation, improvement and recovery of 
the quality of the environment will have a discount of up to sixty 
percent in relation to the value of the fine (art. 143, §2), and the 
resulting discount value may not be less than the minimum fine 
applicable to the infringement (art. 143, §7). In addition, there is 
no applicability of the request for conversion of the fine to repair 
the damages arising from the infractions themselves (art. 141), as 
these must be repaired (art. 143, §1), as will be highlighted below. 
Pursuant to the Federal Decree under review, the taxpayer may 
request the conversion of the simple fine until the time of final 
allegations submission in the sanctioning administrative 
proceeding. If the application submitted is accepted, Article 146 
provides that « the parties shall enter into a commitment, which 
shall establish the terms of the plaintiff’s attachment to the object 
of the fine conversion for the execution term of the approved 
project or its share in the project chosen by the federal agency 
that issued the fine ». Paragraph 1º of the referred article 
emphasizes that the term of commitment shall contain mandatory 
clauses, such as the qualification of the parties, the environmental 
service being converted, the term of the commitment, a fine in 
the event of obligations breached, goals to be met, effects of 
partial or total non-compliance with the object, reparation of 
damage resulting from the environmental infringement and 
competent court to settle disputes. 
Paragraphs 4º and 5º of the aforementioned article state that « the 
signing of the commitment term suspends the enforceability of 
the fine imposed and implies waiver of the right to appeal 
administratively » and that « the execution of the commitment 
term does not end the administrative process and the 
environmental agency shall monitor and evaluate at any time the 
 
46 BRASIL, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DO MEIO AMBIENTE E DOS RECURSOS NATURAIS 
RENOVÁVEIS – IBAMA, Relatório..., p. 81. 
47 Ibidem, p. 02. 
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fulfillment of the agreed obligations ». As can be seen, these 
norms confirm the idea that there is no substitution of the 
imperative and unilateral act by the agreement, which is signed in 
order to consensually model the final act. Therefore, the 
conversion procedure will only be concluded when the agreement 
is concluded, that is, « after the conclusion of the object, an 
integral part of the project, its proof by the executor and the 
approval by the federal agency issuing the fine » (art. 146, 
Paragraph 6). 
CONCLUSION 
Given the theme proposed in this study, it should be noticed that 
consensualism can be a public policy capable of preserving the 
environment. As seen, making a public policy is to seek 
coordination, which can be between the State and society.  
Thus, the disciplined commitment term in article 146 resulting 
from the "simple fine" conversion procedure can be considered a 
public policy, as well as an effective solution to the attainment of 
the public interest, which is the preservation of the environment. 
Still, it can be an instrument capable of increasing the discharge 
rate of environmental fines. This is because, on the one hand, 
there is no denying that consensual solutions, - unlike the 
imposition of fines - can be more efficient to the public interest, 
as consensus decisions tend to be less disrespected than 
unilaterally imposed decisions; and on the other hand, if there is a 
consensus to convert the fine with discount, if the agreement is 
effectively enforced, the fine will be paid and the damage 
repaired. 
In this sense, although the possible benefits arising from the 
Simple Fine Conversion Program cannot be stated with the 
necessary certainty, since the 2018 management report has not yet 
been released to ascertain the rate of adherence to the program 
and the increase in payment of fines, Skinner’s behavioral analysis 
demonstrates that, in the long run, consensual mechanisms are 
more effective than negative sanctions. Even if negative sanctions 
appear to be effective in the short term, in the long run it do not 
eliminate the intended behavior, so that temporary effects are 
achieved with the cost in reducing efficiency. Thus, the proposal 
to change the behavior of violators through positive agreements 
and sanctions may allow the reduction of environmental 
infractions.  
It is concluded, therefore, that public policies aimed at 
consensualism can be mechanisms used to achieve the public 
interest of preserving the environment without damaging its 
unavailability and supremacy. 
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ARAGÃO A. S., “A consensualidade no Direito Administrativo”, 
Revista de Informação Legislativa, Brasília, a. 42, No. 167. 
july/september, 2005. [portuguese] 
BATISTA JÚNIOR O. A., Transações Administrativas, São Paulo, 
QuartierLatin, 2007. [portuguese] 
BRASIL, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DO MEIO AMBIENTE E DOS RECURSOS NATURAIS 
RENOVÁVEIS – IBAMA, Relatório de Gestão, December 2017, 
[https://www.ibama.gov.br/auditorias/relatorios]. (accessed 02 
november 2019) [portuguese] 
BOBBIO N., As sanções positivas, In: Da estrutura à função: novos 
estudos da teoria do direito, Trad. Daniela B. Versiani, Barueri, 
Manole, 2007. [portuguese] 
BUCCI M. P. D., Políticas públicas: reflexões sobre o conceito 
jurídico, São Paulo, Saraiva, 2006. [portuguese] 
CASSESSE, S., “La arena pública: nuevos paradigmas para el 
Estado”, in CASSESSE S., Sabino, La crisis Del Estado. Buenos 
Aires, Abeledo Perrot, 2003. [portuguese] 
DALLARI A. A., “Administração Pública no Estado de Direito”, 
Revista Trimestral de Direito Público, São Paulo, No. 5, 
January/March, 1994. [portuguese]  
DANTAS G. T., “Função promocional do direito e sanção premial 
na perspectiva metodológica de Durkheim”, Revista Direito 
UNIFACS – Debate Virtual, No. 149, november 2012, pp. 12-13, 
[https://revistas.unifacs.br/index.php/redu/article/view/2374/1
743]. [portuguese] 
FERREIRA D., Sanções Administrativas, São Paulo, Malheiros, 2001. 
[portuguese]  
FERREIRA D., Teoria geral da infração administrativa a partir da 
constituição Federal de 1988, Belo Horizonte, Fórum, 2009. 
[portuguese] 
HACHEM D. W.,  “A noção constitucional de desenvolvimento 
para além do viés econômico: reflexos sobre algumas tendências 
do Direito Público brasileiro”, A&C – Revista de Direito 
Administrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, year 13, No. 53, 
pp. 133-168, July/September, 2013. [portuguese] 
Consensualism and state: a solution to the low environmental fines payment rate?  
Mirela Miró Ziliotto   
 
 
– 216 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2020 – Vol 9] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
 
IBAMA’s Normative Instruction nº 6/2018. Brasil, Instituto 
Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis 
– IBAMA, Normative instruction nº 6, february 2018, 
[https://www.ibama.gov.br/conversao-multas-
ambientais#modalildades]. (accessed 02 november 2019) 
[portuguese] 
MARQUES NETO F. A., « Poder de Sanção - Órgão Regulador – 
ANEEL », Revista de Direito Administrativo, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 221, 
2000, p. 355: 
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rda/article/view/4
7607/45131   [portuguese] 
MARQUES NETO F. A., CYMBALISTA T. M., “Os acordos 
substitutivos no procedimento sancionatório e da sanção”, Revista 
Eletrônica de Direito Administrativo Econômico (REDAE), Salvador, 
Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Público, No. 27, 
august/september/october, 2011, 
[http://www.direitodoestado.com/revista/REDAE-27-
AGOSTO-2011-FLORIANO-AZEVEDO-
TATIANAMATIELLO.pdf]. (accessed 02 november 2019) 
[portuguese] 
MEDAUAR O., Odete, Direito administrativo em evolução, 2nd ed, São 
Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 2003. [portuguese] 
MELLO R. M., “Regime Jurídico das Sanções Administrativas”, 
Revista Eletrônica de Estudos Jurídicos da OAB-PR, Curitiba, No. 4, 
2009, p. 37: 
[http://admin.oabpr.org.br/revistaeletronica/?secao=revista04]. 
(accessed 02 november 2019) [portuguese] 
OLIVEIRA G. J., “Governança Pública e Parcerias do Estado: a 
relevância dos acordos administrativos para a nova gestão 
pública”, Revista Eletrônica sobre a Reforma do Estado (RERE), 
Salvador, Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Público, No. 23, 
september/october/november, 2010. p. 2, 
[http://www.direitodoestado.Com/revista/RERE-23-
SETEMBRO-2010-GUSTAVO-JUSTINO-OLIVEIRA.pdf]. 
(accessed 02 november 2019) [portuguese] 
PALMA J. B., Sanção e Acordo na Administração Pública, São Paulo, 
Malheiros, 2015. [portuguese] 
PENA L. C., O papel do controle consensual diante da crise de legitimidade 
do estado, Dissertação (mestrado) – Fundação Mineira de 
Educação e Cultura – FUMEC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em 
Direito, Belo Horizonte, 2012. [portuguese] 
Consensualism and state: a solution to the low environmental fines payment rate?  
Mirela Miró Ziliotto   
 
 
– 217 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2020 – Vol 9] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
 
SASSINE V., “Maiores infratores ambientais são os que menos 
pagam ao IBAMA”, O Globo, 2019, 
[https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/maiores-infratores-ambientais-
sao-os-que-menos-pagam-ao-ibama-23680665]. (accessed 02 
november 2019) [portuguese] 
SHEPPARD B., CUSHMAN F., “Evaluating norms: an empirical 
analysis of the relationship between norm-content, operator, and 
charitable behavior”, Vanderbilt Law Review, Columbia, vol. 63, 
No.1, pp.55-109, 2009. [portuguese] 
SKINNER B. F., Ciência e comportamento humano, São Paulo, Martins 
Fontes, 2003. [portuguese] 
SOUZA C., “Políticas públicas: uma revisão de literatura”, Revista 
Sociologia, Porto Alegre, a. 8, No. 16, July/December, pp. 20-45. 
[portuguese] 
STRUCHINER N., CHRISMANN P. H., “Aspectos filosóficos e 
psicológicos das punições: reunindo algumas peças do quebra-
cabeça”, Caderno CRH,  Salvador,  vol. 25, n. 2,  pp. 133-
150, 2012. p. 133, 
[http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0103-
49792012000500010&lang=pt]. (accessed 02 november 2019) 
[portuguese] 
TELLA M J. F., TELLA F. F., Fundamento e finalidade da sanção: existe 
um direito de castigar?, Trad. Cláudia de Miranda Avena, São 
Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 2008. [portuguese] 
VALLE V. L. L., “Autoridade e consenso nos contratos 
administrativos: um reposicionamento do regime juri ́dico 
contratual brasileiro a ̀ luz da doutrina europeia dos contratos 
administrativos”, in: D. W. HACHEM, E. GABARDO, E. D. 
SALGADO, (Coord.), Direito administrativo e suas transformações atuais 
– Homenagem ao professor Romeu Felipe Bacellar Filho, Anais 
do Semina ́rio da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal do 
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